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I. INTRODUCTION
[1] Evolving technology has advanced communication throughout the
business industry. Corporations use various communication methods to
initiate conversation, propose business ventures, and relay correspondence
from one place to another. Quite naturally, with the development of
different means of communication, various innovations in the legal
profession have materialized and gained popularity. One of these
innovations is electronic discovery.1
[2] When compared to conventional discovery means, electronic
discovery is more proficient, less time consuming, and more easily
organized;2 however, in some circumstances, it can pose difficulties if
performed inefficiently or improperly. Under these circumstances, courts
∗

University of Richmond, T.C. Williams School of Law, J.D. candidate 2010.
FED. R. CIV. P. 26(f)(3)(C) (labeling electronic discovery as “disclosure or discovery of
electronically stored information, including the form or forms in which it should be
produced”); see Junk v. Aon Corp., No. 07 Civ. 4640(LMM)(GWG), 2007 WL 4292034,
at *1 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 3, 2007) (stating that a party referred to electronic discovery as
“software capable of ‘retriev[ing], preserv[ing], documenting and produc[ing] electronic
communications, records, and files’”).
2
See The E-Discovery Standard, APPLIED DISCOVERY’S ELECTRONIC DISCOVERY
NEWSLETTER (LexisNexis Applied Discovery), Apr. 2004, at 1-2, available at
http://www.lexisnexis.com/applieddiscovery/lawLibrary/newsletter/EDS_Apr04.pdf.
1
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must enforce sanctions against those who willfully engage in improper
discovery antics or conduct considered unethical, disobedient, or done in
bad faith.3
[3] The imposition of sanctions on attorneys, parties, or both, dates back
decades; thus, it is not an issue that has developed over the past few
years.4 Early last year in Qualcomm Inc. v. Broadcom Corp.,5 the United
States District Court for the Southern District of California imposed one of
the highest monetary discovery sanction awards in history on Qualcomm
Inc. (Qualcomm) for failure to comply with discovery obligations.6
Sanctions were imposed,7 but the case has been partially vacated and
recently remanded to the magistrate court for further proceedings
pertaining to the sanctioned attorneys.8 This note argues that the United
States District Court for the Southern District of California properly
imposed monetary and disciplinary sanctions on Qualcomm and its
attorneys.
A. SCOPE AND PURPOSE
[4] This note contains three main focuses. First, it examines the historical
background of the law preceding the Qualcomm decision as it pertains to
the imposition of sanctions. Second, this note explores the facts of
Qualcomm and analyzes the district court’s rationale in determining its
decision. Finally, the note concludes with a discussion of the future

3

See generally Chambers v. NASCO, 501 U.S. 32 (1991) (holding that sanctioning those
who abuse judicial processes with bad-faith conduct is within the discretion of the court);
Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752 (1980) (holding that the court has the
inherent power to assess attorneys’ fees); Nat’l Hockey League v. Metro. Hockey Club,
Inc., 427 U.S. 639 (1976) (affirming a court’s discretion to impose extreme sanction of
dismissal for bad-conduct on part of parties and their attorneys).
4
See generally Chambers, 501 U.S. 32; Roadway Express, Inc., 447 U.S. 752; Nat’l
Hockey League, 427 U.S. 639.
5
Qualcomm Inc. v. Broadcom Corp. (Qualcomm I), No. 05cv1958-B (BLM), 2008 WL
66932 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 7, 2008).
6
Id. at *1, *20.
7
See id. at 17.
8
Qualcomm Inc. v. Broadcom Corp. (Qualcomm II), No. 05cv1958-RMB (BLM), 2008
WL 638108, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 5, 2008).
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effects of the Qualcomm decision as it relates to various stages of
discovery.
B. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
1. DEFINITION AND IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS
[5] According to Black’s Law Dictionary, a sanction is “[a] penalty or
coercive measure that results from failure to comply with a law, rule, or
order.”9 Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires
attorneys and parties to make true and good faith representations to the
court and authorizes the court to impose sanctions on an attorney, law
firm, or party if the court determines that the rule has been violated.10
Furthermore, with respect to provisions governing discovery, Rule 26 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires a signature on all discovery
requests and responses.11 This signature certifies that the signing attorney
or party, to the best of his knowledge and after a reasonable inquiry,
verifies the validity of the discovery request or response.12 Rule 26 also
gives courts the authority to impose sanctions, including reasonable
expenses and attorney’s fees, on the person certifying the discovery
request or response, the party on whose behalf the certifier is acting, or
both.13 Additionally, Rule 37 allows a party to file a motion to compel an
opposing party who has failed to comply with a discovery request to
respond accordingly.14 This rule also provides for sanctions against a
party that fails to abide by a discovery order.15
2. JUDICIAL AUTHORITY AND PRECEDENT INVOLVING THE IMPOSITION OF
SANCTIONS
[6] In recent times, courts have imposed sanctions on attorneys, a party,
or both, when misconduct or unethical behavior occurs. These sanctions
9

BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1368 (8th ed. 2004).
FED. R. CIV. P. 11.
11
FED. R. CIV. P. 26(g)(1).
12
FED. R. CIV. P. 26(g)(1).
13
FED. R. CIV. P. 26(g)(3).
14
FED. R. CIV. P. 37(a).
15
FED. R. CIV. P. 37(b)(2)(A).
10
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have included the payment of large amounts of attorney’s fees and costs as
well as disciplinary actions, particularly when large and affluent
corporations are involved.16 To impose these sanctions, the courts have
used rule-based authority derived from the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.17 In addition to the authority given by the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, federal courts possess inherent power to impose sanctions
on attorneys and parties who abuse the judicial process.18
[7] In Fink v. Gomez,19 the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit stated three sources of authority that allow courts to sanction a
party or its attorneys for improper conduct.20 The first source of authority
derives from Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which refers
to pleadings, motions, and other court documents that are signed, filed, or
submitted to the court.21 The second source of authority is 28 U.S.C. §
1927, which penalizes those who unreasonably and purposely prolong
litigation.22 The third source is the court’s inherent power.23 The Fink
court relied on the principles set out by the Supreme Court in Roadway
Express, Inc. v. Piper24 and maintained that the courts have inherent power
to impose sanctions, including attorneys’ fees, for “willful disobedience of
a court order . . . or when the losing party has acted in bad faith,
vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive reasons . . . .”25
[8] In 1991, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the Roadway principles when
it decided Chambers v. NASCO, Inc.26 In Chambers, Supreme Court
Justice White held that the inherent power of courts to impose sanctions
16

See generally Chambers v. NASCO, 501 U.S. 32 (1991) (holding that the excessive
sanctioning for attorney’s fees and costs for bad-faith conduct was appropriate).
17
Id.
18
See id. at 48-49 & n.13.
19
239 F.3d 989 (9th Cir. 2001).
20
Id. at 991.
21
Id. (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 11).
22
Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1927).
23
Id.
24
Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752 (1980).
25
Fink, 239 F.3d at 991 (quoting Roadway Express, Inc., 447 U.S. at 766). The Fink
court stated that the Roadway court also “noted that a court ‘certainly may assess
[sanctions] against counsel who willfully abuse judicial processes.’” Id. (quoting
Roadway Express, Inc., 447 U.S. at 766).
26
See Fink, 239 F.3d at 991-92; see also Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32 (1991).
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had not been displaced with the enactment of 28 U.S.C. § 1927 and the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.27 Chambers, the petitioner, entered into
a contract with respondent NASCO to sell a television station.28 When
Chambers changed his mind and breached the contract, NASCO initiated a
cause of action seeking specific performance of the contract to sell the
television station and a temporary restraining order to prevent an
alienation or encumbrance of the property.29 Chambers subsequently
committed several delaying actions to deprive the district court of
jurisdiction and prolong litigation.30 Chambers asserted several more
efforts to prevent the sale of the television station and was consequently
held in contempt.31
[9] NASCO finally moved for sanctions pursuant to the court’s inherent
powers and after a full briefing and hearing, the court determined that
sanctions against Chambers were appropriate “‘for the manner in which
this proceeding was conducted in the district court from . . . the time that
plaintiff gave notice of its intention to file suit to [now].’”32 In his
defense, Chambers argued that 28 U.S.C. § 1927 and the other
authorizations of sanctions in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure “reflect
a legislative intent to displace the [court’s] inherent power.”33 The Court,
however, rejected this contention by stating that statutes, rules, or a
combination of the two “are not substitutes for the inherent power, for that
power is both broader and narrower than other means of imposing
sanctions.”34 The Court found no basis for holding that the enactment of
statutes and rules prevented the Court from utilizing its inherent power to
sanction Chambers, or any other person, for misconduct.35

27

Chambers, 501 U.S. at 46.
Id. at 35-36.
29
Id. at 36.
30
Id. at 36-39 (noting that Chambers and his lawyer created a trust in which they placed
several properties at issue so they would be beyond the jurisdiction of the court and then
intentionally withheld from the court).
31
Id. at 37-39.
32
Id. at 40 (quoting NASCO, Inc. v. Calcasieu Television and Radio, Inc., 124 F.R.D.
120, 123 (W.D. La. 1989)).
33
Id. at 42-43.
34
Id. at 46.
35
Id.
28
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[10] Although the Supreme Court corroborated the use of inherent powers
to impose sanctions in Chambers, the Fink court distinguished the
circumstances in which inherent powers alone were not sufficient.36 In
Barber v. Miller,37 the Ninth Circuit held that a showing of bad faith is
required for sanctions invoking the court’s inherent power.38 Similarly, In
re Keegan Management Co.39 reiterated that sanctions are allowed only
when an attorney has behaved recklessly in conjunction with some other
improper action.40 Thus, mere recklessness, without a showing of any
other improper purpose, does not justify sanctions under a court’s inherent
power.41
[11] In the Ninth Circuit’s more recent case, Aloe Vera of America, Inc. v.
United States,42 the court held that there was no abuse in discretion when
the district court imposed sanctions on Aloe Vera of America, Inc. (Aloe
Vera).43 The court opined that sanctions were appropriate, as Aloe Vera
had purposely violated its order dated September 28, 2001.44 The court
stated that all federal courts possess inherent powers that enable them to
manage their cases and courtrooms effectively, and as a result of this
function, courts can award attorney’s fees and assess fines.45 This
inherent power is especially important in cases, unlike Qualcomm Inc. v.
Broadcom Corp.,46 where the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are not
applicable.

36

Fink v. Gomez, 239 F.3d 989, 993-94 (9th Cir. 2001). “The district court was correct
that mere recklessness, without more, does not justify sanctions under a court’s inherent
power.” Id.
37
146 F.3d 707 (9th Cir. 1998).
38
Id. at 711.
39
78 F.3d 431 (9th Cir. 1996).
40
Id. at 436.
41
See Fink, 239 F.3d at 993-94; In re Keegan Mgmt. Co., 78 F.3d at 436.
42
376 F.3d 960 (9th Cir. 2004).
43
Id. at 966.
44
Id.
45
Id. at 964-65
46
Qualcomm I, 2008 WL 66932.
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II. THE FACTS OF QUALCOMM
A. PRIOR TO TRIAL
[12] In Qualcomm Inc., Qualcomm filed a patent infringement action
alleging Broadcom Corporation’s (Broadcom) infringement of Qualcomm
patent numbers 5,452,104 (“’104 patent”) and 5,576,767 (“’767 patent”).47
These patents are based on the H.264 standard,48 which was released in
May 2003 and governs video coding.49 Broadcom filed a counterclaim
alleging that one of the patents was unenforceable because of “inequitable
conduct.”50 Broadcom also asserted an affirmative defense that both
patents were unenforceable due to waiver as Qualcomm had participated
in the Joint Video Team (“JVT”), the “standards-setting body” that had
created the H.264 standard.51
[13] Subsequently, Broadcom used several methods of discovery,
including requests for the production of documents, interrogatories and
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 30(b)(6) deposition notices, to
evidence Qualcomm’s participation in the JVT.52 In its First Set of
Requests for the Production of Documents and Things, Broadcom
specifically requested:
[A]ll documents given to or received from a standards
setting body or group that concern any standard relating to
the processing of digital video signals that pertains in any
way to any Qualcomm Patent, including without limitation
communications, proposals, presentations, agreements,
commitments, or contracts to or from such bodies. . . . [and]
all documents concerning any Qualcomm membership,
participation, interaction, and/or involvement in setting any
47

Id. at *1.
See generally Qualcomm Wireless Glossary,
http://www.qualcomm.com/products_services/glossary/ (last visited Feb. 9, 2009)
(providing explanation and background information of the H.264 standard).
49
Qualcomm I, 2008 WL 66932, at *1.
50
Id.
51
Id.
52
Id. at *2. See generally FED. R. CIV. P. 30(b)(6) (discussing the requirements for
depositions).
48
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standard relating to the processing of digital video signals
that pertains in any way to any Qualcomm Patent . . . .53
Broadcom also requested “all documents referring to or evidencing any
participation by Qualcomm in the proceedings of the JVT, the ISO, the
IEC, and/or the ITU-T” as well as any document referencing the JVT of
any Qualcomm patent. 54
[14] In response, Qualcomm’s attorney Kevin Leung certified a discovery
response that stated that the corporation would produce any relevant, nonprivileged documents concerning Qualcomm’s participation in the JVT
that could be located after a reasonable search.55 In these responses,
Qualcomm falsely asserted that it had first attended a JVT meeting in
December 2003 and that it did not submit a JVT proposal until January
2006, having no earlier involvement in the JVT.56
[15] As additional discovery responses were provided and the case
progressed, Qualcomm presented several witnesses, who were designated
representatives of the corporation’s interests in the issues at hand, to be
deposed concerning Qualcomm’s involvement in the JVT.57 Witness
Christine Irvine, who was prepared by Leung, was not given any
documents or information to review beforehand and her computer was not
searched for relevant documents regarding the H.264 standard or
Qualcomm’s participation in the JVT.58 As a result, she incorrectly
testified that Qualcomm had never been involved in the JVT and she was
subsequently impeached by Broadcom with a document evidencing
Qualcomm’s participation in the JVT in 2003.59 Accordingly, Qualcomm
agreed to provide another Rule 30(b)(6) witness, Scott Ludwin.60

53

Qualcomm I, 2008 WL 66932, at *2.
Id. at *2. ISO stands for the International Organization for Standardization. ITU refers
to International Telecommunications Union. See generally Qualcomm Wireless
Glossary, supra note 43 (providing general definitions of ISO and ITU).
55
Qualcomm I, 2008 WL 66932, at *2.
56
Id.
57
Id. at *3.
58
Id.
59
Id.
60
Id.
54
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[16] After designating Ludwin as the corporation’s new representative,
Qualcomm did not search his computer or do anything else in preparation
for his deposition.61 Ludwin also testified falsely as to Qualcomm’s
participation in the JVT and in efforts to impeach him, Broadcom
presented an e-mail list to Ludwin that indicated that a Qualcomm
employee was receiving reports about the JVT in December of 2002.62
Nonetheless, Qualcomm continued to deny its participation in the JVT
during the time of its creation.63
[17] Qualcomm’s participation in the JVT during the creation of the
H.264 standard was an important factor in the litigation.64 If Qualcomm
had participated in 2002 or early 2003, it would have been required to
identify its patents utilized by the H.264 standard and license them
royalty-free.65 Consequently, Qualcomm would have been prohibited
from suing companies, that used the standard, including Broadcom.66
B. DURING TRIAL
[18] As trial began on January 9, 2007, Qualcomm continued to deny its
involvement in the early stages of the creation of the JVT.67 During trial
preparations, attorney Adam Bier came across an e-mail dated August 6,
2002, sent to Qualcomm witness Viji Raveendran welcoming her to the
avc_ce mailing list.68 Following this discovery, Bier and Raveendran
searched her computer and uncovered twenty-one other e-mails dated as
early as November 2002, none of which Qualcomm had produced to
Broadcom in its discovery responses.69 Qualcomm’s counsel decided not
to produce the e-mails found on Raveendran’s computer to Broadcom.70
Qualcomm claimed the e-mails were “not responsive” to the discovery

61

Id.
Id.
63
Id.
64
Id.
65
Id.
66
Id.
67
Id.
68
Id. at *4. See generally id. at *3 n.2 (discussing the relevance of the avc_ce list).
69
Id. at *4.
70
Id.
62
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requests and ignored the fact that the e-mails undermined Qualcomm’s
principal argument.71
[19] During Raveendran’s testimony at trial, Qualcomm’s attorney
avoided asking her any questions that would reveal the presence of the
twenty-one e-mails; however, Broadcom’s attorney asked a question that
forced her to confess that she had received e-mails from the avc_ce list.72
As a result of her testimony, Qualcomm produced the twenty-one e-mails
that they had discovered on Raveendran’s computer.73
[20] The jury returned unanimous verdicts in favor of Broadcom in
reference to the non-infringement of the ’104 and ’767 patents, and in
favor of Qualcomm regarding the validity of the patents.74 The jury’s
unanimous advisory verdict in favor of Broadcom designated the ’104
patent unenforceable due to “inequitable conduct” and the ’104 and ’767
patents unenforceable due to waiver.75
[21] U.S. District Court Judge Rudi Brewster agreed with the jury and
found in favor of Broadcom regarding its waiver defense on the ’104 and
’767 patents, but on the contrary, he found in favor of Qualcomm on
Broadcom’s inequitable conduct claim regarding the ’104 patent.76 Judge
Brewster also found
By clear and convincing evidence that Qualcomm, its
employees, and its witnesses actively organized and/or
participated in a plan to profit heavily by (1) wrongfully
concealing the patents-in-suit while participating in the
JVT and then (2) actively hiding this concealment from the
Court, the jury, and opposing counsel during the present
litigation.77

71

Id.
Id.
73
Id. at *5.
74
Id.
75
Id.
76
Id.
77
Id.
72
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[22] Judge Brewster concluded that Qualcomm had engaged in litigation
misconduct and concealment throughout not only the discovery process,
but also before and after the trial and had thus waived its right to enforce
the ’104 and ’767 patents.78 As a result of Qualcomm’s misconduct,
Judge Brewster granted Broadcom’s Motion for an Award of Attorneys’
Fees.79 Judge Brewster also ordered Qualcomm to pay $9,259,985.09 in
attorneys’ fees and cost.80
C. POST-TRIAL
[23] After the trial had concluded, Qualcomm continued to challenge the
importance of the twenty-one e-mails found on Raveendran’s computer.81
Bier asserted that Qualcomm had performed a reasonable search; however,
Broadcom requested that Qualcomm conduct additional searches to
determine the scope of Qualcomm’s discovery violation.82
[24] As of June 2007, Qualcomm had discovered more than 46,000
relevant documents on the computers of twenty-one employees.83
According to members of Qualcomm’s general counsel, James Batchelder
and Louis Lupin, thousands of these unproduced documents revealed
information that was inconsistent with the arguments made on
Qualcomm’s behalf during trial.84 Batchelder apologized for not finding
the documents earlier and for asserting inconsistent arguments at trial.85
III. ANALYSIS
[25] After hearing oral argument and reviewing the District Court Judge’s
Orders, Magistrate Judge Barbara L. Major concluded that sanctions were
appropriate because Qualcomm and its attorneys had intentionally
withheld thousands of documents relevant to the litigation.86 Magistrate
78

Id.
Id.
80
Id.
81
Id. at *6.
82
Id.
83
Id.
84
Id.
85
Id.
86
Id. at *17.
79
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Judge Major correctly sanctioned Qualcomm and six of its attorneys for
violating discovery obligations because the evidence of the violation was
clear and convincing.87 When discussing the legal standard used to
impose sanctions on parties who fail to abide by discovery rules and court
orders, Magistrate Judge Major referenced Rules 37 and 26 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure.88
[26] Rule 37 authorizes courts to sanction parties who do not comply with
a motion to compel discovery.89 Qualcomm argued that Broadcom was
not entitled to sanctions under Rule 37(a) or (b) because Broadcom failed
to file a motion to compel discovery.90 Magistrate Judge Major suitably
criticized this contention by noting that Qualcomm agreed to produce all
relevant documents and had answered interrogatories, thus leaving
Broadcom with no reason to file a motion to compel discovery.91 The
filing of a motion under these circumstances would not have served as a
compellation of discovery, but as a measure of preservation of
Broadcom’s rights in the event that Qualcomm had suppressed
documents.92 Nevertheless, Broadcom’s failure to file a motion to compel
discovery limited the available remedies under Rule 37(a) and (b) to those
only covered under Rule 37(c).93
[27] Furthermore, a strict interpretation of Rule 26 would also restrict
Broadcom’s available remedies. Magistrate Judge Major referred to the
language of Rule 26 that authorizes sanctions against individual attorneys
who fail to comply with discovery obligations.94 Under a literal reading of
Rule 26, only the attorney who certified the false or misleading discovery
response is held responsible for the violation.95 Therefore, in this case,
only Leung or another specific Qualcomm attorney could be held liable
for the discovery violation despite that fact that several Qualcomm
attorneys participated in the process of discovery.
87

See id. at *6.
Id. at *7.
89
FED. R. CIV. P. 37(b)(2).
90
Qualcomm I, 2008 WL 66932, at *8; see id. n.4.
91
Id. at *8.
92
Id.; see id. n.4.
93
See FED. R. CIV. P. 37.
94
Qualcomm I, 2008 WL 66932, at *7.
95
See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(g)(3).
88
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[28] Fortunately for Broadcom, Magistrate Judge Major correctly went
beyond the scope of the literal interpretation of Rule 26 to justify the
imposition of sanctions against Qualcomm.96 In her rationale, she
referenced the Advisory Committee Notes to the 1983 Amendment to
Rule 26, which explain that there is an affirmative duty to conduct
discovery in a “responsible manner that is consistent with the spirit and
purposes of Rules 26 through 37.”97 Failing to comply with discovery
rules under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure without a substantial
justification is a blatant disregard of discovery obligations and warrants
sanctions.98
[29] In addition to the remedies available under Rule 37(c) and a broad
interpretive reading of Rule 26, courts have the inherent power to sanction
attorneys, parties or both when they fail to comply with discovery
obligations.99 As the Chambers Court stated, “other mechanisms, taken
alone or together, are not substitutes for the inherent power, for that power
is both broader and narrower than other means of imposing sanctions.”100
Using an approach similar to the Supreme Court’s decision in Chambers,
Magistrate Judge Major correctly used the court’s inherent power to
impose sanctions on Qualcomm and its attorneys.
IV. THE FUTURE EFFECTS OF THE QUALCOMM DECISION
A. DISCOVERY
[30] The Qualcomm case will likely improve the proficiency of discovery
investigations of electronic documents in the future. After criticizing
Qualcomm’s search during the discovery process, the court gave an
example of an adequate investigation:
An adequate investigation should include an analysis of the
sufficiency of the document search and, when electronic
documents are involved, an analysis of the sufficiency of
96

See Qualcomm I, 2008 WL 66932, at *7.
Id.
98
See id. at *9.
99
Chambers v. NASCO, 501 U.S. 32, 46 (1991).
100
Id.
97

13

Richmond Journal of Law & Technology

Volume XV, Issue 3

the search terms and locations. In the instant case, a
reasonable inquiry should have included using the JVT, avc
and H.264 search terms and searching the computers of
Raveendran, Irvine, Ludwin (and other Qualcomm
employees identified in the emails discovered on the
computers of these witnesses).101
[31] This statement provides a road map on how to conduct an adequate
discovery investigation that can be used by attorneys in the future to test
the sufficiency of their own investigations. This could potentially reduce
the frequency of discovery violations and save attorneys and corporations
money, time, and embarrassment.
B. 30(B)(6) WITNESSES
[32] After the false testimonies of Christine Irvine and Scott Ludwin,
Qualcomm provided a valid example of how not to adequately prepare a
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 30(b)(6) witness.102 Rule 30(b)(6)
states that any person designated as a deponent “must testify about
information known or reasonably available to the organization.”103 This
imposes a duty on the corporation to “make a conscientious good-faith
endeavor to . . . prepare those persons in order that they can answer fully,
completely, unevasively, the questions posed . . . .”104
[33] The Qualcomm decision serves as a warning to future corporate
litigants who request or provide designees as Rule 30(b)(6) witnesses.
Because of the possible scrutiny a witness could endure, corporations in
the future are likely to conduct an adequate preparation of all witnesses
designated as its most knowledgeable representatives. Attorneys are also
likely to better prepare persons for depositions to avoid impeachment.

101

Qualcomm I, 2008 WL 66932, at *11.
See id. at *3.
103
FED. R. CIV. P. 30(b)(6).
104
S.E.C. v. Morelli, 143 F.R.D. 42, 45 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (citing Mitsui & Co., Inc. v.
Puerto Rico Water Resources Authority, 93 F.R.D. 62, 67 (D.P.R. 1981)).
102
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C. COUNSEL AND CLIENT INTERACTIONS
1. ATTORNEY CLIENT PRIVILEGE
[34] In the Qualcomm appellate case, Judge Brewster vacated the
magistrate court’s order denying the self-defense exception to the
attorney-client privilege.105 The motion filed for a finding of a selfdefense exception to Qualcomm’s attorney-client privilege was unopposed
by Qualcomm and denied by the magistrate judge because Qualcomm had
not presented any evidence against its attorneys.106 After the magistrate
court denied the motion, however, Qualcomm filed four declarations that
were “exonerative of Qualcomm and critical of the services and advice of
their retained counsel.”107 Subsequently, Judge Brewster vacated the
order since the declarations “change[d] the factual basis which supported
the court’s earlier order denying the self-defense exception to
Qualcomm’s attorney-client privilege.”108 This could potentially affect
the assertion of the attorney-client privilege in the future.
[35] Judge Brewster allowed the attorney-client privilege to be infiltrated
because of the “introduction of accusatory adversity” between Qualcomm
and its attorneys.109 Judge Brewster’s action lowers the standard by which
the severance of this privilege is permitted and could significantly impact
the relationship between a corporation and its retained counsel in the
future. When corporations and their retained counsel attempt to exonerate
themselves in the future, they will be less inclined to condemn the other in
efforts to appear less blameworthy. The Qualcomm appellate case will
prevent them from using the other as a scapegoat to avert the imposition of
sanctions.

105

Qualcomm Inc. v. Broadcom Corp. (Qualcomm II), No. 05CV1958-RMB (BLM),
2008 WL 638108, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 5, 2008).
106
Id. at *2.
107
Id. at *3.
108
Id.
109
Id.
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2. INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL COUNSEL
[36] Qualcomm will potentially affect the actions and relationships
between internal and external counsel in the future. Qualcomm tried to
hold its outside counsel liable for its failure to comply with discovery
obligations by making statements such as, “outside counsel selects . . . the
custodians whose documents should be searched.”110 Magistrate Judge
Major rejected these statements as they did not relieve Qualcomm or its
internal counsel of their obligations.111 The court stated that there were
several “warning flags,” which should have alerted Qualcomm that its
search was inadequate, flags that internal counsel “inadvertently” ignored
and to which outside counsel chose to exert willful blindness.112 This
criticism by the court will likely encourage a checks and balances system
between future internal and external counsel. External counsel will also
be more prone to make inquiries in regards to the designation of witnesses
and the efficiency of researched discovery responses to internal legal
counsel before certifying and relying on them in court.
V. CONCLUSION
[37] With companies such as Qualcomm Incorporated and Broadcom
Corporation enabling the expansion of the wireless industry, electronics
will continue to develop to facilitate effortless and reliable communication
between corporate entities and organizations.113 These ever-evolving
technological advances could further complicate the known difficulties
involved when conducting extensive electronic discovery throughout
complex litigation. To avoid sanctions, attorneys and corporations need to
know how to efficiently manage electronic discovery.
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[38] Since Qualcomm and its attorneys were sanctioned on the basis of a
correct application of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the court’s
inherent power, the Qualcomm case provides a road map for future
litigation involving extensive electronic discovery. Parties who are
wronged by opposing litigants that are remiss in their discovery
obligations have several remedies under the law. First, if a party has filed
a motion to compel discovery, the party has the benefit of remedies under
Rule 37(a) through (c) as opposed to only Rule 37(c), which is the only
remedy available under this rule to those who have not filed a motion to
compel.114 Second, notwithstanding the filing of a motion to compel, a
broad interpretation of Rule 26 authorizes sanctions against those who
abuse the judicial system.115 Finally, a federal court can use its inherent
power to penalize abusers of the judicial process.116
[39] Although the Qualcomm holding serves as a warning to those
involved in risky, complex litigation, it also reassures the public that our
legal system is based on justice by enforcing sanctions on litigants that
commit obvious wrongs. Taking into consideration the advances in
electronically stored information, the court noted: “[f]or the current ‘good
faith’ discovery system to function in the electronic age, attorneys and
clients must work together to ensure that both understand how and where
electronic documents, records and emails are maintained and to determine
how best to locate, review, and produce responsive documents.”117
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